Abstract-Fault analysis is a powerful attack to stream ciphers. Up to now, the major idea of fault analysis is to simplify the cipher system by injecting some soft faults. We call it soft fault analysis. As a hardware-oriented stream cipher, Trivium is weak under soft fault analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and Results of Our Work
Side-channel analysis of stream ciphers [1] is a class of novel attacks by combining physical and mathematical methods, including fault analysis [2] , power analysis [3] , timing analysis, etc. In the class of side-channel analysis, fault analysis is a powerful attack. Up to now, the major idea of fault analysis is to simplify the cipher system by injecting some soft faults (that is, by changing the values of some positions at some moment), thus revealing the key hidden in the encryption machine. We call such attack soft fault analysis. Soft fault analysis is a known differential attack [4] , by which the attacker can obtain additional low-degree-equations of the state. Trivium [5] , [6] is a hardware-oriented stream cipher, and one of the finally chosen ciphers by eSTREAM project, but it is weak under soft fault analysis [7] , [8] .
In this paper we consider another type of fault analysis of stream cipher, which is to simplify the cipher system by injecting some hard faults (that is, by setting the values of some positions permanently 0). We call it hard fault analysis. Such attack was presented by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir [9] , used for breaking block ciphers. We present the following results about hard fault analysis of Trivium. In Case 1 with the probability not smaller than 0.2396, the attacker can obtain 69 Y. Hu and F. Zhang are with the CNIS Laboratory, Xidian University, 710071 Xi'an, China e-mail: (yphu@mail.xidian.edu.cn; zhfl203@163.com).
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bits of 80-bits-key. In Case 2 with the probability not smaller than 0.2291, the attacker can obtain all of 80-bits-key. In Case 3 with the probability not smaller than 0.2291, the attacker can partially solve the key. In Case 4 with non-neglectable probability, the attacker can obtain a simplified cipher, with smaller number of state bits and slower non-linearization procedure. In Case 5 with non-neglectable probability, the attacker can obtain another simplified cipher. Besides, these 5 cases can be checked out by observing the key-stream.
The contents are organized as follows. Next subsection is an explanation to soft fault analysis and hard fault analysis. In section II we prepare for hard fault analysis of Trivium, including description of Trivium, our assumptions, notations, and some facts. In section III we present different features of fault injected machine, in 7 different cases. In this section we show that, in each of former 5 cases, either the key can be revealed, or the cipher can be practically simplified. In section IV we present an algorithm to identify the cases, by observing the key-stream. In this section we identify the former 4 cases with the probability closed to 1, and identify Case 5 with the probability no smaller than 4/5. Section V is the conclusion and future work expectation.
B. Soft Fault Analysis and Hard Fault Analysis
Soft fault analysis is based on soft fault injection. At a random moment of the encryption machine's driving procedure, the attacker changes the values of some random positions of the state. By the differential of the key-stream, the attacker can obtain several additional low-degree-equations of the state.
Hard fault analysis is based on hard fault injection. The attacker makes the values of some random positions of the state permanently 0. That is, after hard fault injection, those injected bits can be read out as 0, but can no longer be written in. According to technical restriction, hard fault injection must be made before the encryption machine's driving procedure.
Three comparisons between hard fault analysis and soft fault analysis are as follows.
Comparison 1: Hard fault analysis is more practical than soft fault analysis. The main criticism against soft fault analysis was the transient fault model that was claimed to be unrealistic [9] . Hard fault injection is a current technique for micro-probing, and has already become real danger to cipher chip [10] . For example, DS5003 is a new product of Maxim. It is a secure microprocessor chip by using coating technique, for resisting hard fault injection.
Comparison 2: Hard fault analysis is more expensive than soft fault analysis. Soft fault injection is assumed to be made by simple fault induction (special kind of light, magnetic disturbance, or other brute methods). Hard fault injection needs expensive FIB and related equipment. Comparison 3: After soft fault analysis, an encryption machine can be returned back to the owner and be used again. On the other hand, after hard fault analysis, an encryption machine is destroyed, so that it seems meaningless to reveal the hidden key for this machine. By this, it may be considered that hard fault analysis is not as valuable as soft fault analysis. This may also be the reason for that hard fault analysis has sparsely appeared in the literature of stream cipher analysis.
For Comparison 3, we argue that hard fault analysis is useful in some application scenes. One scene is that current key is used for decrypting the former plain-texts before they are outdated. Another scene is that the system has a weak key-renewal-algorithm, where current key can help to predict future keys. The third scene is that several machines share a common key, or have closely related keys.
II. PREPARATION FOR HARD FAULT ANALYSIS OF TRIVIUM A. Trivium Key-Stream Generation and Trivium State Initialization
The state of Trivium is 288 bits long, denoted as (s 1 , · · · , s 288 ). The state is renewed by 3 combined NFSRs (Non-linear Feedback Shift Registers). The first NFSR is 93 bits long, denoted as (s 1 , · · · , s 93 ). The second NFSR is 84 bits long, denoted as (s 94 , · · · , s 177 ). The third NFSR is 111 bits long, denoted as (s 178 , · · · , s 288 ). Current key-stream bit is a linear function of current state. Table 1 is an equivalent algorithm for the key-stream generation.
The key is 80 bits long, denoted as (k 1 , · · · , k 80 ), and is secret. IV (Initial Vector) is 80 bits long, denoted as (IV 1 , · · · , IV 80 ), and is public. In other words, if anyone obtains an encryption machine, he can arbitrarily set the value of IV. Table 2 is an equivalent algorithm for the initial state generation. Table 1 and Table 2 show that, for key-stream generation and initial state generation, the state renewal is the same. In detail, let s (t,j) denote the state bit at time t and position j, then Table 3 presents a clearer description for the state renewal.
Lemma 1: [5] , [6] Let (s 1 , · · · , s 288 ) denote the initial state (that is, the state at the time just before generating z 0 ). Take {z 0 , z 1 , z 2 , · · · } as functions of (s 1 , · · · , s 288 ). Then 1) {z 0 , z 1 , · · · , z 65 } are 66 linear functions.
2) {z 66 , z 67 , · · · , z 147 } are 82 quadratic functions. 
3) {z 148 , z 149 , · · · , z 213 } are 66 cubic functions. 4) Each of {z 214 , z 215 , · · · , } is at least a quartic function. Lemma 1 shows such a weakness of Trivium that its non-linearization procedure is over slow. By knowing the key-stream, a large number of low-degree-equations will be obtained.
B. Assumptions, Notations and Some Facts
Suppose that the attacker obtains an encryption machine (or an encryption card, etc), equipped with Trivium. He wants to obtain the hidden key (k 1 , · · · , k 80 ). He makes hard fault injection. The hard fault bits are from random one of 3 NFSRs, and at random positions in this NFSR. At injecting moment, he can not control the positions of hard fault bits. After injection, he does not know the positions of hard fault bits. Then he set(IV 1 , · · · , IV 80 ) = (0, · · · , 0). That is, for initial state generation procedure, the input state is
. Then he starts up the machine (initial state generation and keystream generation), and checks the output key-stream from this fault-injected machine.
It is easy to see that our assumptions are quite trivial. P L denotes the lowest position of injected faults. P H denotes the highest position of injected faults. According to our assumptions, P H and P L fall into the same index set {1, · · · , 93}, or {94, · · · , 177}, or {178, · · · , 288}. P L is of the following 7 cases. 
Suppose j is a position of hard fault injected bit, where 94 ≤ j ≤ 177. Then s (t,j+m) = 0 for each (t, m) such that t ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ m ≤ min{177 − j, t}.
Suppose j is a position of hard fault injected bit, where178 ≤ j ≤ 288. Then s (t,j+m) = 0 for each (t, m) such that t ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ m ≤ min{288 − j, t}.
III. FEATURES OF FAULT INJECTED MACHINE IN 7 CASES
A. Features of Fault Injected Machine in Case
Lemma 2: The state at time 27 is the follow. 1)
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 are clear by gradually renewing the state (see Table 3 ), and by considering the state at time 0:
Proof: By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, z 0 = s (1152,66) , z 1 = s (1153,66) , z 2 = s (1154,66) · · · . So that the key-stream (z 0 z 1 z 2 · · · ) has a period 69. Again z 0 = s (1152,66) = s (27,45) = k 18 . Proposition 1 is proved.
B. Features of Fault Injected Machine in Case 2:178 ≤ P L ≤ 243
Lemma 4: The state at time 27 is the follow. 1)
Proof: We induce the state at time 27 by gradually renewing the state.
The state at time 1:
The state at time 2:
The state at time 3:
The state at time 13:
The state at time 14:
Notice that 1) and 2) of Lemma 3 are still true for Case2: 178 ≤ P L ≤ 243. Now we present a definition. For each t such that t ≥ 27, define a t+1 = s (t,66) + s (t,91) s (t,92) + s (t,93) . For each t such that 0 ≤ t < 27, define a t+1 = a t+70 .
Lemma 5:
2) {a t+1 , t ≥ 27} has a period 69, where
Proof: 1) is clear from Trivium state renewal. For each t such that t ≥ 27, each j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ 69, s (t,j) = s (27,j−t+27(mod69)) . So that
= s (27,24−t(mod69)) + s (27,49−t(mod69)) s (27,50−t(mod69)) +s (27,51−t(mod69)) .
So that 2) is true, and 3) is immediate from 2). Lemma 5 is proved.
Lemma 6: Take the following changes for the state at time 27. (s (27, 172) , · · · , s (27, 177) ) are changed as (s (27, 172) , · · · , s (27,177) ) = (s (27,94) + a 27 , s (27,95) + a 26 , · · · , s (27,99) + a 22 ), and other positions of the state at time 27 are kept unchanged. Then 1) For each t such that t ≥ 33, (s (t,1) , · · · , s (t,177) ) and (s (t,243) , · · · , s (t,288) ) are kept unchanged.
2) The key-stream (z 0 z 1 z 2 · · · ) are kept unchanged.
Proof: Proof: Notice that we are in Case 2: 178 ≤ P L ≤ 243, and that the state bits shift rightwards. So that Lemma 6 is clear.
Lemma 7:
Take the state at time 27 as the changed value as described in Lemma 6. Then For each t such that t ≥ 27, each j such that 94 ≤ j ≤ 177, s (t+78,j) = s (t,j) + a t+172−j .
Proof:
2) If 172 ≤ j ≤ 177 and t ≥ 33, then 156 ≤ j − 6 ≤ 171 and t − 6 ≥ 27. By 1),
3) If 172 ≤ j ≤ 177 and t = 27, then 94 ≤ j − 78 ≤ 99, so that s (27+78,j) = s (27,j−78) . By the assumptions of Lemma 6,
Lemma 7 is proved.
Lemma 8:
Take the state at time 27 as the changed value as described in Lemma 6. Then 1) For each t such that t ≥ 27, each j such that 94 ≤ j ≤ 177,
2) {(s (t,1) , · · · , s (t,177) ), t ≥ 27} has a period 3358. Proof: According to Lemma 5, Lemma 6, Lemma 7 and the fact that 1794 = 78 × 23 = 69 × 26,
m=0 a t+34−j+3m , so that 1) is true. According to 1), for each t such that t ≥ 27, each jsuch that 94 ≤ j ≤ 177,
This implies that {(s (t,94) , · · · , s (t,177) ), t ≥ 27} has a period 3358. Again by the fact that {(s (t,1) , · · · , s (t,93) ), t ≥ 27} has a period 69, 2) is true. Lemma 8 is proved. (27, 25) .
All these equations are enough to determine the true value of (s (27, 25) , · · · , s (27,93) , s (27,100) , · · · , s (27,177) , a 28 , · · · , a 96 ), so that enough to determine the value of (k 1 , · · · , k 69 ). Besides, all these equations can determine the value of (k 68 k 69 + k 70 , k 69 k 70 + k 71 , · · · , k 78 k 79 + k 80 ), so that determine the value of (k 70 , · · · , k 80 ). 
C. Features of Fault Injected Machine in Case
Proof: Lemma 10 is just similar to Lemma 5. 2) The key-stream (z 0 z 1 z 2 · · · ) are kept unchanged.
Proof: Notice that we are in Case 3: 1 ≤ P L ≤ 66, and that the state bits shift rightwards. So that Lemma 11 is clear.
Lemma 12: Take the state at time 98 as the changed value as described in Lemma 11. Then for each t such that t ≥ 98, each j such that 178 ≤ j ≤ 288, s (t+87,j) = s (t,j) + b t+265−j .
Proof: The proof of Lemma 12 is somewhat similar to that of Lemma 7. The proving details are the follow. 1) If 178 ≤ j ≤ 264 and t ≥ 98,then t + 265 − j ≥ 99, so that s (t+87,j) = s (t+265−j,178) = s (t+264−j,264) + a t+265−j = s (t,j) + a t+265−j .
2) If 265 ≤ j ≤ 288 and t ≥ 122, then 241 ≤ j −24 ≤ 264 and t − 24 ≥ 98. By 1), s (t+87,j) = s (t−24+87,j−24) = s (t−24,j−24) + a t−24+265−(j−24) = s (t,j) + a t+265−j .
3) If 265 ≤ j ≤ 288 and t = 98, then 178 ≤ j − 87 ≤ 201, so s (98+87,j) = s (98,j−87) . By the assumptions of Lemma 11, s (98+87,j) = s (98,j−87) = s (98,j) + a 98+265−j .
4)
If 265 ≤ j ≤ 288, 99 ≤ t ≤ 121, and j −(t−98) ≤ 264, then 242 ≤ j − (t − 98) ≤ 264. By 1),
5) If
Lemma 12 is proved.
Lemma 13: Take the state at time 98 as the changed value as described in Lemma 11. Then 1) For each t such that t ≥ 98, each j such that 178 ≤ j ≤ 288,
2) {(s (t,94) , · · · , s (t,288) , t ≥ 98)}has a period 4524. Proof: According to Lemma 10, Lemma 11, Lemma 12 and the fact that 2262 = 87 × 26 = 78 × 29,
, so that 1) is true. According to 1), for each t such that t ≥ 98, each j such that 178 ≤ j ≤ 288,
This implies that {(s (t,178) , · · · , s (t,288) , t ≥ 98)} has a period 4524. Again by the fact that {(s (t,94) , · · · , s (t,177) , t ≥ 98)} has a period 78, Lemma 13 is proved. (98, 208) , · · · , s (98,264) ) = (0, · · · , 0). This fact and all former equations are enough to determine the true value of (s (98, 202) , · · · , s (98, 288) ).
Up to now, 243 variables {s (98,100) , · · · , s (98,177) , s (98,202) , · · · , s (98,288) , b 99 , · · · , b 176 } have already been uniquely determined. According to Lemma 14, the attacker can solve the value of (a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a 92 ), which is the closest to the key (k 1 , · · · , k 80 ). (a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a 92 ) is an unknown function of (k 1 , · · · , k 80 ), because hard fault positions are unknown. But  (a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a 92 ) can partially reveal the key, as described in Proposition 4 and Proposition 5.
Lemma 15: Suppose the indices of hard-fault-injected-bits are not from the set {j, j + 1, · · · , j + m}, where 1 ≤ j ≤ j + m ≤ 93. Then s (m,j+m) = s (0,j) . (1, 66) , · · · , s (12,66) ). Suppose a t+1 = 1 for some t such that 0 ≤ t ≤ 11, then the indices of hard-fault-injected-bits are never from the set {66−t, 67−t, · · · , 66}, or else there would be a contradiction. According to Lemma 15,
Proposition 4 is proved.
and 93) ). Suppose a t+1 = s (t,91) s (t,92) + s (t,93) = 1 for some t such that 67 ≤ t ≤ 91, then the indices of hard-fault-injectedbit are never from the set {93 − t, 94 − t, · · · , 92}, or else there would be a contradiction. Notice that (a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a 12 ) = (s (0,66) , s (1, 66) , · · · , s (11, 66) ). So that 1) and 2) are true. Now suppose that 93 is not an index of hard-fault-injectedbit.
For each u such that 13 ≤ u ≤ t − 27, we have 93 − t ≤ 66 − u < 91 − u < 92 − u < 93 − u ≤ 80, so that
For
a) is true. Now suppose that 93 is an index of hard-fault-injected-bit. Then s (0,93) = s (1,93) = · · · = s (91,93) = 0.
For each u such that 13 ≤ u ≤ t − 27, we have 93 − t ≤ 66 − u < 91 − u < 92 − u ≤ 79, so that
Proposition 5 is proved.
D. Features of Fault Injected Machine in Case 4: 163 ≤ P L ≤ 171
Proposition 6: Suppose we are in Case 4:
and the state is degraded into 273 bits (s (t,1) , s (t,2) , · · · , s (t,162) , s (t,178) , s (t,179) , · · · , s (t,288) ).
2) The state renewal is the follow.
( s (t,287) ).
3) The state renewal is reversible, and the inverse is the follow. Proposition 6 and Proposition 7 present a simpler cipher than Trivium. It has a smaller number of state bits and a slower non-linearization procedure. So that it is easier to solve the state at a fixed time. If the state at a fixed time is known, the key will be known by reversing the state. · · · = s (t+8,171) + s (t+8,186) + s (t+8,273) .
E. Features of Fault Injected Machine in
So that 2), 3), · · · , 9) are true, by considering 1). Lemma 17 is proved. The following Proposition 9 is our checking result. 
G. Features of Fault Injected Machine in Case
Case 7 has many features similar with former cases. Here are some examples.
If 244 ≤ P L ≤ 264, the features are similar to those of Case 4.
If 265 ≤ P L ≤ 287, the features are similar to those of Case 5.
If P L = 288, the features are similar to those of Case 6. If 67 ≤ P L ≤ 69, the features are similar to those of Case 4.
If 70 ≤ P L ≤ 92, the features are similar to those of Case 5.
If P L = 93, the features are similar to those of Case 6.
IV. CASES CHECKING
In this section we present an algorithm, to check the case by observing the key-stream (z 0 z 1 z 2 · · · ). We firstly define 6 features for (z 0 z 1 z 2 · · · ). Under our natural assumptions, Algorithm selectes wrong cases with a neglectable probability. In step 5) of Algorithm, we can also take the case directly as Case 5. The probability of mistake is no more than 1/5.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
From all of the discussions above, it is clear that Trivium is weak under hard fault analysis, with our trivial assumptions.
Hard fault injection will lead us to continue our work. One future work is combined fault analysis of Grain. Grain is another hardware-oriented stream cipher, and one of the finally chosen ciphers by eSTREAM project. We find Grain much stronger under either soft or hard fault analysis. We will combine hard fault injection and soft fault injection, looking for weakness of Grain. The second future work is the study under weaker assumptions. One weaker assumption is that, after fault injection, the values of those injected bits are permanently 0 or 1.
